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INTRODUCTION 
In America, policy is a primary concern in creating, 
implementing, and interpreting the law. What happens when policy 
interests conflict? Which rights dominate? In the context of media 
broadcast, transmission, and storage, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has recently skirted these questions when balancing the 
competing interests of technological innovation and copyright law. 
Over the centuries, Congress has legislated increasingly in favor of 
copyright interests, overturning Supreme Court jurisprudence to the 
contrary. However, the Constitution provides Congress with the power 
to advance both the arts and sciences.
1
 Congress should allow science 
to advance, in the form of technological innovation, in balance with 
protecting original works of authorship. 
As technology continues to develop in the form of new devices 
and new means to perform, display, and access digital content, the 
inherent conflict between protecting original works of authorship and 
fostering technological innovation will increase. As discussed in this 
Article, copyright is federal statutory protection of original works of 
authorship.
2
 “‘Copyright’ literally means the right to copy. The term 
has come to mean that body of exclusive rights granted by law to 
authors for protection of their work.”3 Pertinent to this Article are 17 
U.S.C. § 106(4) and (5), which grant the copyright owner the exclusive 
right to “perform”4 and “display,”5 respectively, “motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works . . . publicly.”6 
In the 2014 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 
ruling (“Aereo”),7 the Supreme Court interpreted the Copyright Act’s 
“public performance” and “transmit” clauses in such a way that content 
retransmission through cloud services or remote storage equipment 
clearly breach the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “perform” or 
“display” her works.8 Yet, in the same opinion, the Court expressly 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS: UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ1a.html.  
 3. Id.  
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2016).  
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2016).  
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2016).  
 7. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502–03 (2014) (Through its “servers, 
transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas,” Aereo’s subscribers received broadcast 
television over the Internet for a monthly charge. Television producers, distributors, and 
broadcasters sued, alleging copyright infringement.).  
 8. Matt Schruers, Why Aereo Matters to the Cloud: A Primer, DISRUPTIVE 
COMPETITION PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-
property/030414-why-aereo-matters-to-the-cloud-a-primer/ (Broadcasters’ definition of 
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refused to address whether copyright infringement occurs in “cloud 
computing, remote storage DVRs, and other novel issues.”9 Aereo’s 
narrow ruling
10
 suggests that the Supreme Court may be wary of 
creating a blanket rule for retransmission in light of the broadening 
technological mediums and capabilities.
11
 
When the Copyright Act
12
 is enforced against media transmission 
technologies such as the DVR and cloud computing,
13
 technological 
development is stifled to the detriment of our society.
14
 Where the 
Court declines to rule, certain companies and technologies will 
continue to boom, but other entities and devices such as Aereo’s 
antenna
15
 may not be so fortunate.
16
 Additionally, potential innovations 
may be precluded from entering the market for lack of investment due 
to the unpredictable nature of the courts in this context. 
This Article will explore the history of the Copyright Act and its 
application to the transmission of copyrighted works in the media.
17
 
Because of the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act and the 
 
public performance in Aereo is very similar to “multiple people stor[ing] their own, unique, 
lawfully acquired copy of the latest hit single in the cloud, and then play[ing] it to 
themselves over the Internet,” which is exactly what cloud storage technologies like 
Dropbox, SkyDrive, iCloud, and Google Drive enable.).  
 9. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“We agree with the Solicitor General that [q]uestions 
involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not before the 
Court, as to which Congress has not plainly marked [the] course, should await a case in 
which they are squarely presented.”).  
 10. Ruchir Patel, The Legal Lag Behind Emerging Technology: Aereo - Innovation or 
Exploit?, BOSTON COLLEGE INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH. FORUM, July 16 2015, 1, 4; see 
also infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 11. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding, Aereo has since been applied 
narrowly, only relevant to community antenna television provider cases. Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 703, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that issues 
regarding third party domains “are beyond Aereo’s reach”). 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016), et seq.  
 13. Enforcement thus far has been selective. See Patrick Hughes, Aereo’s Online TV 
Service Violates Copyright Law, High Court Rules, 32 WESTLAW JOURNAL COMPUTER AND 
INTERNET 3 (2014) (“The court said it has yet to consider if public performance rights are 
infringed by such actions as the remote storage of content.”).  
 14. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright Law, 18 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 548 (2009) (“DMCA [Digital Millenium Copyright Act], section 
1201 is unconstitutional.”).  
 15. Aereo’s antenna transmits subscribers broadcast television programming over the 
Internet, essentially simultaneously with the broadcast. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.  
 16. Ali Sternburg, 8 Passages from the Supreme Court’s Aereo Decision that May 
Have Negative Implications for the Cloud, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 25, 
2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/062514-8-passages-supreme-
courts-aereo-decision-may-negative-implications-cloud (“The certainty provided by Cartoon 
Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2008) (popularly known as 
Cablevision) led to additional investment in U.S. cloud computing companies ranging from 
$728 million to $1.3 billion during the two years after the decision.”).  
 17. All discussion will be regarding economic rights, not moral rights.  
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Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Aereo,18 it is unclear which 
technologies will survive Supreme Court review without congressional 
action. With a somewhat arbitrary delineation on the books, 
technological business prospects have become increasingly murky. 
This uncertainty, combined with Congress’s clear favoring of copyright 
interests in duration and scope, unbalances the competing interests of 
technology and art. 
At the heart of regulating media transmissions are three major 
issues: 
(1) Whether an entity “transmits” such that it “publicly performs”; 
(2) Which governmental body is in the best position to regulate 
media transmissions: Congress or the Court; and 
(3) Whether it is in the People’s interest to protect copyright 
(original works of authorship) over science (technological innovations). 
To explore these issues, Part II of this Article will cover 
background information on the history of United States copyright laws, 
describe the current federal copyright statutory scheme, and review 
penalties for copyright infringement.
19
 Part III will present the 
problem: that Congress has caused copyright interests to take over 
technological innovation and public access to art.
20
 Part IV will 
introduce Title 17’s Compulsory Licensing scheme, provide an 
overview of how jurisprudence has regulated media transmissions of 
copyrighted content, and review the recent Aereo
21
 decision in light of 
the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act.
22
 Finally, Part V will 
propose two methods to protect authors’ interests to their works 
without stifling technological development, in the form of expanding 
the Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing provision23 and limiting 
copyright duration.
24
 This solution aims to provide both copyright 
owners and technology innovators a just result compatible with 
constitutional objectives.
25
 
 
 18. Patel, supra note 10, at 1, 4; see also infra note 243. 
 19. See infra Part II.  
 20. See infra Part III.  
 21. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 22. See infra Part IV.  
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).  
 24. See infra Part V.  
 25. See infra Part VI.  
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I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF FEDERAL COPYRIGHT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. Origins and Elements of Federal Copyright in the United States 
For over two centuries, the United States has officially recognized 
a need to protect authors’ works in order to promote the development 
of art and science.
26
 The United States Constitution grants Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”27 Today, 
technology embodies the term “useful arts.”28 “The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents 
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’”29 Congress initially wielded this power in May of 1790 when it 
enacted the first federal copyright law.
30
 
This first copyright law designated only “maps, charts and 
books.”31 Later statutory enactments recognized music, drama, and 
works of art.
32
 Within two weeks of enacting the first copyright law, a 
work was registered with the U.S. district court clerks.
33
 In 1870 – 
almost a century later – copyright functions were centralized in the 
Library of Congress.
34
 Since then, “the Copyright Office has registered 
more than 33,654,000 claims to copyright and mask works
35
 and 
provided many millions of deposits . . . [to its] collections.”36 Today, 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 28. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949).  
 29. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).  
 30. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS: UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.  
 31. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834) (quoting Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 
(1790)).  
 32. Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,606 (June 22, 2012) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).  
 33. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS: UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.  
 34. Id.  
 35. A “mask work” is a series of three-dimensional images that are layered to form a 
semiconductor chip. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (2016); see also Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced 
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
 36. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS: UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.  
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the Copyright Office registers half a million copyright claims and 
records over 11,000 documents with hundreds of thousands of titles 
every year; it also “collects for later distribution to copyright holders a 
quarter of a billion dollars in cable television, satellite carrier, and 
Audio Home Recording Act compulsory license funds.”37 
1. Scope of Copyright Protection 
“The Copyright Clause . . . empowers Congress to define the 
scope of the substantive right.”38 Thus, “Congress’s power to bestow 
copyrights is broad.”39 However, this is not a grant of omnipotence as 
only original works may be protected,
40
 for a limited duration,
41
 from 
public performance
42
 unless licensed.
43
 Congress has wielded its 
legislative power many times to include more types of works, to extend 
the duration of copyright, and to clarify copyright holders’ exclusive 
rights, most notably in 1909, 1976, and 1988.
44
 
The history of the federal Copyright Act reveals its expansive 
amplitude in its recognition of original works of authorship. “‘The two 
fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] originality and 
fixation in tangible form . . . .’”45 
a. Original Works of Authorship 
Initially, “[a] work must be original to be copyrightable.”46 
“Original” in the copyright context means that the author 
independently created the work (as opposed to copying it from other 
works) and thus generated the work with at least some small degree of 
creativity.
47
 
Unlike a patent, which protects the idea itself, copyright protects 
only the expression of the idea.
48
 To illustrate, where two authors each 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003).  
 39. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 40. “The sine qua non of copyright is originality.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
 41. “[A] copyright must be limited in duration.” Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.  
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).  
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016) (compulsory licensing provisions for cable systems). 
 44. For a timeline of amendments beginning in 1909, see 1–TL NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT (2015).  
 45. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 355 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 51 (1976)).  
 46. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2007); Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346 
(“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).  
 47. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345.  
 48. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy 
Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[C]opyright law protects an 
individual’s concrete expression of his own idea.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016) (“In 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
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independently make their own map of the same territory, and the maps 
are perfectly identical, “each [author] may obtain the exclusive right to 
make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the 
other’s copyright.”49 “The copyright protects originality rather than 
novelty or invention – conferring only ‘the sole right of multiplying 
copies.’”50 
Over time, Congress has offered protection to more types of 
works. First, only maps, charts, and books were protected.
51
 Then, 
legislation included designing, engraving, and etching.
52
 In 1831, 
musical compositions were added, followed by dramatic compositions 
in 1856, and then photographs and their negatives in 1865.
53
 Today, the 
Copyright Act denotes eight categories of works of authorship: “(1) 
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) 
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”54 This expansion of 
types of works protected over the history of the Copyright Act, and the 
current list of categories in which authors may find protection for their 
work, reveals the inclusive nature of the Copyright Act’s scope.55 
b. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression 
The second criteria for copyright protection is that it be “fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).  
 49. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 
150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“[T]wo directories, independently made, are each entitled to 
copyright, regardless of their similarity, even though it amount [sic] to identity. Each being 
the result of original work, the second will be protected, quite regardless of its lack of 
novelty.”)); see also Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346 (“[A]ssume that two poets, each ignorant 
of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, 
hence, copyrightable.”).  
 50. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (quoting Jewelers Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Publ’g, 
281 F. 83, 94 (1922)).  
 51. Id. at 208 (“In 1790 the First Congress conferred a copyright on ‘authors of any 
map, chart, book or books already printed.’”).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 208-09.  
 54. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 114-288); see also 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing 
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5664) (“[T]he designation ‘works of authorship’ is not meant to be limited to 
traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays. Rather, Congress used this phrase to 
extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve.”). 
 55. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).  
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communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”56 
The fixation requirement first appeared in the 1976 Amendment to the 
Copyright Act,
57
 but its appearance denotes only greater flexibility in 
Congress’ intent to protect more works.58 Former versions of the 
Copyright Act, from the first federal copyright statute in 1790 (listing 
maps, books, charts)
59
 to the Copyright Act of 1909, merely listed 
specific works of authorship that could qualify for protection.
60
 Yet 
congressional intent of inclusivity has been expressed since the 1909 
Act, wherein section 5 provided that, regarding listed works for 
registration, “the above specifications shall not be held to limit the 
subject-matter of copyright . . . , nor shall any error in classification 
invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under this Act.”61 
Similar to the original work of authorship requirement, fixation is 
easily achieved. Here, Congress’ intent to protect a wide range of 
works is evidenced by the words “any tangible medium of expression, 
now known or later developed.”62 This language demonstrates that 
Congress had technological development in mind when it sought to 
protect original works of authorship. Additionally, by outlining 
categories of works of authorship
63
 and having a broad definition of 
“fixed,”64 as opposed to presenting a finite list of certain works,65 
copyright protection is effectively available to a wider range of 
possible works than could otherwise be predicted
66
 or listed. 
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to note that it is 
well-established that television shows
67
 and movies are protected under 
 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016). 
 57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (1976).  
 58. Copyright Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
 59. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).  
 60. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909) (listing books, periodicals, lectures, sermons, addresses, 
dramatic or dramatico-muscial compositions, maps, works of art (including models or 
designs), reproductions of a work of art, drawings or plastic works of a scientific or 
technical character, photographs, prints and pictorial illustrations.    
 61. Copyright Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).  
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016) (emphasis added).  
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).  
 64. “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being 
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made 
simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).  
 65. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208-210 (1954).  
 66. “Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is 
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.” Lotus Dev. 
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664).  
 67. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A 
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the Copyright Act’s “motion pictures and other audiovisual works” 
category.
68
 While a live television broadcast is not per se eligible for 
federal copyright protection,
69
 if it is simultaneously recorded and 
transmitted,
70
 or the work broadcasted is a copyrighted writing,
71
 it will 
qualify for protection.
72
 Even characters
73
 and commercials
74
 are 
copyrightable. 
c. Copyright Duration 
Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the task 
of defining the scope of authors’ limited private monopoly to their 
works, to ensure the public obtains access.
75
 While authors are initially 
vested with the copyright to their work,
76
 some reproductions of the 
work are in the public domain.
77
 Congress cannot allow copyright to 
exist in perpetuity.
78
 “[A]n infinite copyright would deprive the public 
 
[television] program is a particularized form of expression, not an idea” and is therefore 
copyrightable.).  
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2016).  
 69. “Motion pictures do not include ‘live telecasts that are not fixed simultaneously 
with their transmission.’” 1–2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09 n. 29.  
 70. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52-53 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (“[A]ssuming it is copyrightable-as a 
‘motion picture’ or ‘sound recording,’ for example-the content of a live transmission should 
be accorded statutory protection if it is being recorded simultaneously with its 
transmission.”); accord 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08 (“Because most television and 
many radio stations now customarily record their live broadcasts on video or audio tape 
simultaneously with the live transmission, the effect of the above provision would 
apparently render such broadcasts eligible for statutory copyright.”).  
 71. “[A] live television broadcast of a play or musical composition presents underlying 
material that itself qualifies as a writing . . . [T]he broadcast itself is still not a writing; but 
because the work being broadcast is a writing, the authors’ exclusive rights include the 
control of unauthorized broadcasts.” 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08. 
 72. See 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08.  
 73. Especially distinctive characters, such as James Bond, Godzilla, and Rocky Balboa, 
have been afforded copyright protection. “[C]opyright protection ‘may be afforded to 
characters visually depicted in a television series or a movie.’” Halicki Films, LLC v. 
Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Olson v. NBC., 855 
F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988)).  
 74. Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782 (D. 
Md. 2008) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)) (2007) (“[C]ommercials fall into the category of 
‘motion pictures and other audiovisual works.’”).  
 75. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).  
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2016).  
 77. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; see also Warner Bros. Entm’t v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 
584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s a general proposition, the public is not limited solely to 
making exact replicas of public domain materials, but rather is free to use public domain 
materials in new ways (i.e., to make derivative works by adding to and recombining 
elements of the public domain materials).”).  
 78. “Congress cannot ‘create[] a species of perpetual . . . copyright.’” Golan v. 
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
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of the benefit—the right to use and enjoy the expression—that it is 
supposed to receive in exchange for the grant of monopoly privileges 
to the author for a discrete period of time.”79  
A modern example can be found in Warner/Chappell Music’s 
enforcement of its copyright on the “happy birthday” song lyrics.80 The 
company had earned about $2 million a year in royalties for all 
renditions of the song,
81
 despite the fact that it only owned the 
copyright to the melody, not the lyrics.
82
 The company’s profits 
endured for more than eighty years to the public’s detriment83 until a 
federal court ruled on this matter, thus officially releasing the “happy 
birthday” lyrics for all to use.84 
d. Term Measurement 
An essential question in copyright protection is when an author’s 
term of exclusive rights begins. Start dates that have been considered 
for measuring the term include the date of creation, the date of 
registration with the Library of Congress, the date of first public 
dissemination,
85
 the life of the author, and the date of publication.
86
 
There are certain issues with each, but the common theme is that there 
will always inevitably be a gap
87
 between when the work is created, or 
is in the initial stages of creation, or is disseminated, and the date that it 
is registered or published.
88
 Moreover, there are some instances where 
 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)).  
 79. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184 (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–34) (“The rights of a . . . 
copyright holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain under which, once the . . . copyright 
monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . . work at will and without attribution.”).  
 80. See Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 975 (C.D. Cal. 2015).  
 81. Christine Mai-Duc, All the 'Happy Birthday' song copyright claims are invalid, 
federal judge rules, LA TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-happy-birthday-song-lawsuit-decision-20150922-story.html.  
 82. See Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1002–03.  
 83. See Mai-Duc, supra note 81.  
 84. See Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1002–03.  
 85. “The word ‘dissemination’ is used here in the sense of making the work known to 
others by whatever means its nature permits.” Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of 
Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 72 (1961), 
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  
 86. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–74 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  
 87. See id. at 74.  This is not true of terms set for the “life of the author,” but for 
reasons set forth in Part IV(B)(3) of this Article, infra, “life of the author” is not the term 
that should be used for copyright protection.  
 88. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–74 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  
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dissemination to the public does not constitute publication,
89
 so if 
publication were the criteria for initializing copyright, some works 
would be unprotected even though the public had experienced them. 
Accordingly, Congress has not been consistent in its measurement 
of the protected term. In 1790, the term began when the title was 
recorded in the clerk’s office.90 In 1909, published works received 
copyright protection from the date of publication, and unpublished 
works received copyright protection from the date of their registration 
with the Copyright Office.
91
 In 1976, Congress again altered its 
method.
92
 Unlike the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts, the 1976 Act 
protected works created by identified natural persons from the date of 
the work’s creation until 50 years after the author’s death.93 
Additionally, “[f]or anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and 
works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from 
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first.”94 The 
latest amendment to the Copyright Act, the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), retains the 1976 measurement 
methods
95
 and does not require registration for copyright protection.
96
 
e. Term Duration 
In contrast with the incongruous methods for measuring the start 
of the copyright term, consistent throughout the versions of the 
Copyright Act is the availability of two terms of copyright protection.
97
 
Though the duration of the terms have changed with each 
amendment,
98
 a copyrighted work is afforded protection over a term, 
 
 89. There are “uncertainties as to what constitutes publication” such that “it is difficult 
in many situations to determine whether or when publication occurred.” Additionally, 
“[w]orks which are performed for millions through the medium of radio and television are 
thought to be unpublished in the copyright sense if no copies through which the work can be 
visually perceived have been distributed.” Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of 
Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–71 (1961),  
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  
 90. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).  
 91. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.  
 92. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2003) (citing Copyright Act §§ 302–
304, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).  
 93. Id. (citing Copyright Act § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).  
 94. Id. at 195 (citing Copyright Act § 302(c), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).  
 95. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2016).  
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2016) (“registration is not a condition of copyright 
protection”).  
 97. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (renewal of second term conditioned upon a 
second recording within six months before expiration of the first term).  
 98. See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text.  
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with a second term of equal or lesser duration possible upon renewal.
99
 
Either the author or a designated class of beneficiaries may renew.
100
 
With each amendment to the Copyright Act, Congress has 
exercised its constitutional authority
101
 to extend the duration of the 
existing copyright term.
102
 The first copyright act in 1790 provided that 
copyright would endure for 14 years, and could be renewed for a 
second term of 14 years
103
 if the author applied for renewal within one 
year of the end of the first term.
104
 “Congress expanded the federal 
copyright term to 42 years in 1831 (28 years from publication, 
renewable for an additional 14 years), and to 56 years in 1909 (28 years 
from publication, renewable for an additional 28 years).”105 The 1976 
Copyright Act provided copyright protection from the date of creation 
until 50 years after the author died.
106
 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998 
was “the fourth major duration extension of federal copyrights.”107 The 
CTEA essentially “[r]etain[ed] the general structure of the 1976 Act,” 
but added another 20 years of protection for works created by natural 
persons, making copyright endure through the author’s life plus 70 
years.
108
 “For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works 
made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from 
creation, whichever expires first.”109 In addition, any copyright in its 
term of renewal when the CTEA became effective (October 27, 1998), 
 
 99. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.  
 100. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Renewal of Copyright, Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 31, at 110–11 (1961), 
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study31.pdf (Copyright Act of 1790 § 1: “executors, 
administrators or assigns”; Act of 1831: “author’s widow and children”); Copyright Law 
Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 
30, at 77 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf (1909 Act: “author’s 
widow, widower, children, the author’s executors, or the next of kin”); 17 U.S.C. § 
304(a)(1)(C) (the widow, widower, or children of the author, the author’s executors, or the 
author’s next of kin).  
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 102. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2007); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (“Text, history, and precedent . . . confirm that the Copyright 
Clause empowers Congress to prescribe ‘limited Times’ for copyright protection and to 
secure the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders, present and 
future.”).  
 103. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.  
 104. Copyright Act of 1909, section 23, lines 7–23.  
 105. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.  
 106. Id. at 193.  
 107. Id. at 194-195 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2002).  
 108. Id. at 195–96 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2002)); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 
1179, 1181–82.  
 109. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2002)).  
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receives protection for 95 years from the date its copyright was 
originally secured.
110
 
 
 Term Start Date 1st Term 2nd Term 
1790 Registered 14 yrs. 14 yrs. 
1831 Published 28 yrs. 14 yrs. 
1909 Published / Registered 28 yrs. 28 yrs. 
1976 Natural Persons: 
Creation 
Natural Persons: 50 
yrs. from author’s 
death 
47 yrs.
111
 
Anonymous / Works 
Made for Hire: 
Publication or Creation 
Anonymous / Works 
Made for Hire: 75 or 
100 yrs.; first to 
expire 
1998 Natural Persons: 
Creation 
Natural Persons: 70 
yrs. from author’s 
death 
67 yrs.
112
 
Anonymous / Works 
Made for Hire: 
Publication or Creation 
Anonymous / Works 
Made for Hire: 95 or 
120 yrs.; first to 
expire 
 
Extensions in duration have been applied to both future and 
existing copyrights.
113
 “History reveals an unbroken congressional 
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the 
benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be 
governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”114 Furthermore, 
policy considerations prevent putting an author in a worse position 
after the passage of a new act.
115
 
Since its 1998 enactment, the CTEA has since been challenged,
116
 
 
 110. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2016).  
 111. “[C]opyright may be renewed for a second term of forty-seven years.” Capano 
Music, a Div. of Britone, Inc. v. Myers Music, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(citing Copyright Act, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)); 3–9 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.05.  
 112. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2016).  
 113. “Thus, in common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA’s new terms 
apply to both future and existing copyrights.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.  
 114. Id. at 200.  
 115. Id. at 204; accord, Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension, 
18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000) (“[S]ince 1790, it has indeed been 
Congress’s policy that the author of yesterday’s work should not get a lesser reward than the 
author of tomorrow’s work just because Congress passed a statute lengthening the term 
today.”).  
 116. Petitioners to the action argued, inter alia, that “[e]xtending an existing copyright 
without demanding additional consideration . . . bestows an unpaid-for benefit on copyright 
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but was upheld on constitutional grounds.
117
 “Nothing before this Court 
warrants construction of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension as a 
congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’ 
constraint.”118 
2. Transmissions 
When copyright subsists pursuant to Title 17, section 102 of the 
United States Code, section 106 “grants the copyright holder 
‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five 
qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted work in 
copies.”119 There is no infringement where there is no copying.120 In 
congruence with technological development,
121
 Congress legislated to 
protect new forms of copying
122
 now available through technological 
transmission.
123
 
Over time, the technology with which to transmit images, sounds, 
and motion pictures has developed and increased the range of ways 
works of art can be transmitted. For over a century, Congress has 
attempted to account for new ways to ‘copy’ protected works by 
granting copyright owners the exclusive right to perform their works 
publicly.
124
 
The concept of “public performance” first appeared in 1856, 
approximately sixty-six years from the enactment of the first federal 
statute.
125
 The act of January 6, 1897 further extended public 
 
holders and their heirs, in violation of the quid pro quo requirement.” The Court 
“demur[red] to petitioners’ description of the Copyright Clause as a grant of legislative 
authority empowering Congress ‘to secure a bargain—this for that,’” reasoning that 
“Congress could rationally seek to ‘promote . . . Progress’ by including in every copyright 
statute an express guarantee that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative 
extension of the copyright term.” Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 214–15.  
 117. Id. at 199 (holding the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
constitutional).  
 118. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. “The CTEA’s baseline term of life plus 70 years . . . 
qualifies as a ‘limited Tim[e]’ as applied to future copyrights.” Id. at 199. 
 119. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1984) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 106).  
 120. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).  
 121. “Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing 
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 430.  
 122. Id. at 430 (“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to 
significant changes in technology.”).  
 123. “The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with . . . 
technological improvements in means of dissemination . . . .” Id. n. 12 (citing Foreword to 
B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, vii-viii (1967)). 
 124. “[A]ny person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right . . . to perform or 
represent the copyrighted work publicly . . . .” Copyright Act § 1(d)–(e), 35 Stat. 1075 
(1909).  
 125. “The author’s public performing rights were first included in statutory copyright in 
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performing rights to musical works.
126
 Similarly, player pianos and 
perforated roles of music preceded the Copyright Act of 1909,
127
 which 
added works prepared for oral delivery and created the “for profit” 
limitation.
128
 When the public performance provision
129
 was enacted, 
“its purpose was to prohibit unauthorized performances of copyrighted 
musical compositions in such public places as concert halls, theaters, 
restaurants, and cabarets.”130 Commercial radio allowed instantaneous 
performance to distant and separate audiences who used their radio sets 
to turn the broadcast to audible form.
131
 Later, Congress passed the 
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971
132
 to address “record piracy” 
issues arising from the development of the audio tape recorder.
133
 
Likewise, “innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory 
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision 
of the Copyright law.”134 Furthermore, technology that enabled 
retransmission of television programs by cable or microwave systems 
prompted the 1976 enactment of a compulsory licensing scheme
135
 for 
cable companies.
136
 
Manifest in the legislative history of the Copyright Act, and in 
present-day judicial interpretation of the terms “public performance” 
and “to transmit,” is the ever-broadening scope of the ‘limited private 
monopoly’137 that is copyright. Technological innovation has spurred 
 
respect to dramatic works by the act of August 18, 1856.” Copyright Law Revision Studies, 
Limitations on Performing Rights, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 16, at 81 (1960), 
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study16.pdf.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11 (citing 
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)).  
 128. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Limitations on Performing Rights, Prepared for 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 16, at 81–82 (1960), 
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study16.pdf.  
 129. “Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. s 1(e), ‘(t)o perform the copyrighted work 
publicly for profit.’” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975).  
 130. Twentieth Century Music, 422 U.S. at 157 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1909)).  
 131. Id. at 157–58 (Federal courts established that “the broadcast of a copyrighted 
musical composition by a commercial radio station was a public performance of that 
composition for profit—and thus an infringement of the copyright if not licensed.”).  
 132. “To amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited 
copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication 
and piracy of sound recording, and for other purposes.” UNITED STATES STATUTES AT 
LARGE, PL 92–140, October 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391.  
 133. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n. 11 (1984).  
 134. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11.  
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) (1976).  
 136. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11.  
 137. Twentieth Century Music, 422 U.S. 151, 156; Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32; Harper & 
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Congress to expand authors’ copyrights, to the detriment of 
transmissions technology. 
B. Penalties for Copyright Infringement 
Since 1790, the Copyright Act has, in some form, granted certain 
recovery to the copyright owner. Over time, criminal penalties for 
willful infringement have been added, with threat of more to come.
138
 
Consequently, infringers could face double liability in the form of civil 
and criminal penalties. 
Anyone who violates any of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights is an infringer.
139
 The first federal statute provided that an 
infringer would be civilly liable, and that he must “forfeit and pay the 
sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in his . . .  
possession . . . .”140 Over time, the amount of damages increased by 
type of work under the statute,
141
 and copyright offenders could also be 
halted from infringing upon owners’ rights through injunctive relief.142 
The 1909 Act also laid out the penalty for willful infringement, 
establishing that knowing and willful for profit copying, or aiding and 
abetting of such copying, makes one guilty of a misdemeanor.
143
 The 
same section gave the court discretion to impose a criminal penalty 
upon conviction, in the form of a fine from one hundred to one 
thousand dollars and/or imprisonment up to one year.
144
 
1. Types of Penalties 
Today, the same types of penalties are imposed, to a greater 
degree. “The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with a 
potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his work.”145 
Remedies include: injunctions, impoundment and destruction of 
violating reproductions, actual damages (including any additional 
profits), and attorney’s fees.146 Regarding damages, the copyright 
owner may elect to recover an award of statutory damages instead of 
 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); see also Graham v. 
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (regarding patents).  
 138. See infra notes 151–161.  
 139. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2016).  
 140. Copyright Act § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).   
 141. For example, “[i]n the case of dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or 
orchestral composition, one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every 
subsequent infringing performance.” Copyright Act § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).   
 142. Copyright Act § 25(a), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).   
 143. Copyright Act § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).   
 144. Copyright Act § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).  
 145. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (1983)).  
 146. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433–34 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (1983)).   
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actual damages and profits.
147
 The Copyright Act also includes a 
provision that the prevailing party may recover full costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees,148 giving copyright owners even more 
reason to sue and transmission technology innovators even more reason 
to be wary. Furthermore, in the aggregate, statutory damages
149
 may 
become astronomical where there are multiple instances of 
infringement such that the final figure awarded may be so gross as to 
violate substantive due process.
150
 
2.Willful Infringement 
Amendments to the Copyright Act and subsequent judicial 
interpretation have widened the threshold for liability. Though “[t]he 
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement 
committed by another,”151 and there are “limitations on liability relating 
to material online,”152 the ever-expanding range of copyright protection 
is likely to impact current and future transmission technologies.
153
 
Additionally, because transmission technology providers may now be 
held directly liable
154
 (as opposed to secondarily liable
155
) for copyright 
infringement,
156
 there is greater exposure to criminal liability.
157
 
Moreover, the willfulness requirement
158
 is easier to meet, as 
transmission technology providers know that transmissions without a 
license constitute copyright infringement.
159
 In 2014, the White House 
 
 147. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016). See also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2016) (“In a case 
where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that 
infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”).   
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2016).  
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016).   
 150. J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-
Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright 
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526–(2004) (“Congress should modify the Copyright 
Act’s minimum statutory damage provision because, when massively aggregated in the file-
sharing scenario, it imposes an unconstitutional grossly excessive penalty.”).  
 151. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016). 
 153. See infra Part IV(B)(2).  
 154. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (transmission technology 
provider found liable for direct infringement); See infra Part IV(B)(2).  
 155. “Most suits against equipment manufacturers and service providers involve 
secondary-liability claims.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J. dissenting).   
 156. “The defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant itself ‘trespassed 
on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.’” Id. at 2513 (quoting CoStar Grp., Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original).  
 157. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2016).  
 158. “‘[W]illfully’ as used in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) connotes a ‘voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty.’” United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2013).   
 159. But see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the 
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not 
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and the Department of Justice urged Congress to make willful, 
unlicensed streaming of copyrighted content a felony,
160
 but the Senate 
bill introduced to amend the criminal penalty provision was not 
enacted.
161
 
II. THE PROBLEM: CONGRESS FAVORS COPYRIGHT DESPITE 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Through its ever-growing Copyright Act, Congress favors 
copyright to the detriment of the public interest in promoting 
advancements in both science and art. Though technological 
developments continue to create new ways to experience art that may 
infringe upon copyright holders’ exclusive rights, Congress has lost 
sight of the original purpose of copyright as framed in the United States 
Constitution.
162
 By continually expanding copyright owners’ limited 
private monopoly,
163
 Congress is handicapping the public
164
 and 
stripping copyright of its utilitarian purpose of promoting “Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”165 Furthermore, as the Court follows 
congressional copyright legislation,
166
 technological innovation will be 
increasingly inhibited in the realm of developing media data 
transmissions,
167
 unless Congress amends the Copyright Act
168
 to 
benefit the public at large rather than a limited range of “owners” who 
 
before us . . . [such as] cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not 
before the Court . . . .”). 
 160. Bill Donahue, White House Says Streaming Online Should Be Felony, LAW 360 
(Nov. 19, 2014, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/technology/articles/597696?nl_pk=73d4406b-27b3-4e54-adf0-
b7212b7778bd&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=technology;  
Monica Rodriguez, On the Legality of Watching Unlicensed TV Streams, Intellectual 
Property & Technology Forum at Boston College Law School (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://bciptf.org/?p=1654.  
 161. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2016); see also S. 978 (112th), GovTrack, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s978.  
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 163. See supra Part III(B).  
 164. The longer works are kept from the public domain, the longer, the public must wait 
to enjoy the art, create derivative works, and learn. “Potential users of [original works of 
authorship] include not only movie buffs and aging jazz fans, but also historians, scholars, 
teachers, writers, artists, database operators, and researchers of all kinds—those who want to 
make the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 250 (2003). See also infra Part V(B).  
 165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “[T]he financial reward guaranteed to the copyright 
holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself.” Berlin v. E. 
C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964).  
 166. See infra Part IV(B)(1).  
 167. See Eldred, infra, note 278 and accompanying text.  
 168. See infra Part V(B).  
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may or may not have created the work.
169
 
III. ANALYSIS: REGULATION OF MEDIA TRANSMISSIONS TO 
COPYRIGHT’S ADVANTAGE 
The history of the battle between copyright owners and media 
transmission technologies providers yields a prevailing outcome 
favoring copyright owners.
170
 Whenever the Court sides with the 
technology provider, Congress eventually amends the Copyright Act to 
override the Court’s decisions, and in effect, increases the scope of 
protection for the copyright owner.
171
 The determination of whether 
copyrights or transmissions technologies prevail ultimately turns on 
judicial interpretation of terms “public performance” and “transmit” in 
view of legislative history and intent.
172
 
A. Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licensing for cable systems, now codified in Title 17, 
section 111, emerged in 1976 as a solution to balance broadcasters’ and 
cable systems’ competing interests.173 Where the courts had previously 
held that signal amplification resulting in secondary transmission of 
broadcasted content did not constitute public performance,
174
 the 1976 
Amendment made clear that cable companies must license the 
copyrighted content they enable their subscribers to view.
175
 
When cable was first introduced, the majority of cable television 
programming consisted of secondary transmissions, i.e. others’ 
broadcasted signals.
176
 Such secondary transmissions enabled “the 
unforeseen emergence of cable television as a full competitor to 
broadcast television.”177 Essentially, television broadcasting stations 
would emit their shows’ signals, and cable television systems would 
 
 169. See infra notes 279–283 and accompanying text.  
 170. See infra Part IV(B).  
 171. See infra Part IV(B)(2). 
 172. See infra Part IV(B).  
 173. “Compulsory licensing not only protects the commercial value of copyrighted 
works but also enhances the ability of cable systems to retransmit such programs carried on 
distant broadcast signals, thereby allowing the public to benefit by the wider dissemination 
of works carried on television broadcast signals.” Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 
U.S. 691, 710–11 (1984).  
 174. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 
(1968); see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 412-15 
(1974).  
 175. “The Copyright Office is the administrative agency charged with overseeing the 
compulsory license scheme of Section 111.” WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 
604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 176. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.  
 177. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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capture those signals, amplify them, and then transmit them by cable or 
microwave over wire to their paying subscribers.
178
 
Despite federal protection for publicly performed works, cable 
television systems were not interested in paying licensing fees or 
royalties to copyright owners
179
 for the content they transmitted.
180
 This 
set the stage for the dispute regarding what constitutes “public 
performance.” In 1968, the Supreme Court took Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists Television, Inc. (“Fortnightly”) under review.181 The 
Court held that cable television systems do not “perform” copyrighted 
works within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act, sections 1(c) and 
1(d).
182
 Though the statutory language must be read through a lens of 
“drastic technological change,” the Court reasoned that enhancing the 
viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals did not constitute 
a “performance.”183 
In opposition to the Supreme Court’s interpretation, Congress 
amended the Copyright Act to add compulsory licensing for cable 
systems.
184
 Without compulsory licensing, cable systems would have to 
negotiate for the rights to every work. Congress decided that copyright 
owners deserved compensation, but also that cable systems would need 
to be able to operate sustainably.
185
 “[I]t would be impractical and 
unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with 
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable 
system.”186 
However, the statute applies only to cable systems; it does not 
give the same rights to any other transmissions technology.
187
 Since 
“1999, the Copyright Office explicitly rejected the claim that Internet 
retransmission services could qualify for a Section 111 license.”188 This 
is important because there is a significant public interest in providing 
 
 178. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.  
 179. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.   
 180. “Cable television systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, 
amplify them, and then transmit those signals by cable or microwave, and ultimately send 
the signals by wire to their paying subscribers.” 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.  
 181. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).  
 182. Id. at 402.  Sections 1(c) and 1(d) of the 1909 Copyright Act set forth the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights of performance and delivery of the copyrighted work.  Copyright 
Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).  
 183. Id. at 396, 401. 
 184. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).   
 185. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 711 n. 15 (1984) (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 94–1476, at 89 (1976)).  
 186. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 711 n. 15 (1984) (citing H.R. Rep. 
No. 94–1476, at 89 (1976)).  
 187. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).  
 188. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) aff’d, 691 F.3d 
275 (2d Cir. 2012).  
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fast and easy access to a wide range of content, which developing 
transmission technologies can support. However, because such 
technologies are not granted the same compulsory licensing that cable 
systems receive, they are left to struggle to license each separate 
work.
189
 Congress has acknowledged this system as “impracticable and 
unduly burdensome.”190 Granting one type of technology a licensing 
scheme thus frustrates the innovation of new technologies
191
 that could 
be revolutionary in transmissions and mass communication. 
 
B. Media Transmissions Jurisprudence – Redefining “Public 
Performance” 
Amendments to the Copyright Act have tipped the scales in favor 
of copyright owners in cases against transmission technology providers 
for copyright infringement, as the Court has found that a greater range 
of parties “publicly perform” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 
 1. Regulation Prior to the 1976 Amendment 
“Under the relevant Supreme Court decisions192 prior to 1976, it 
was not a copyright violation for cable television stations to retransmit 
the signal of broadcast stations.”193 Under the 1909 Copyright Act, 
“which lacked any analog to the Transmit Clause, a cable television 
system that received broadcast television signals via antenna and 
retransmitted these signals to its subscribers via coaxial cable did not 
‘perform’ the copyrighted works and therefore did not infringe 
copyright holders’ public performance right.”194 At the time, the 
Supreme Court distinguished broadcasters (active performers) from 
viewers (passive beneficiaries), though viewers supply their own 
 
 189. Crisp, 467 U.S. at 711 n. 15 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976)).  
 190. Id.  
 191. Amanda Asaro, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based Service Providers Can Have 
Their Copyrighted Cake and Eat it Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2014) 
(proposing “a compulsory licensing scheme specific to cloud-based service providers”).  
 192. “The relevant history of the Transmit Clause begins with two decisions of the 
Supreme Court, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.” Cmty. TV of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. 
Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 (D. Utah 2014) (quoting WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 
685 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)) (internal 
citations omitted).  
 193. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
 194. WNET Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 685, cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2498 (2014) (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1968)).  
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equipment for viewing the performance.
195
 
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor 
of a motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with 
visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer 
conversely does more than a member of a theater audience; he 
provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into audible 
sound and visible images. Despite these deviations from the 
conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the 
Copyright Act, broadcasters have been judicially treated as 
exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater audience. 
Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform. Thus, while both 
broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television 
process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active 
performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.
196
 
Accordingly, the Court held in Fortnightly
 
that a community 
antenna television (“CATV”) system did not publicly perform because 
it “no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the 
broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an 
efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.”197 The viewer could 
have similarly “erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, 
and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, [and] he would not 
be ‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set.”198 
Hence, “the reception and distribution of television broadcasts by the 
CATV systems . . . did not constitute a ‘performance’ within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act, and thus did not amount to copyright 
infringement.”199  
Similarly, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 
(“Teleprompter”), the reception and transmission of “broadcast beams 
by means of special television antennae owned and operated by 
Teleprompter,” was not public performance where transmission was 
made through “cable or a combination of cable and point-to-point 
microwave to the homes of subscribers,” and subscribers’ own 
television sets converted the electromagnetic signals into images and 
sounds.
200
 Even new functions added to the CATV service did not 
make Teleprompter an infringer. “The copyright significance of each of 
these functions—program origination, sale of commercials, and 
 
 195. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.  
 196. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 161 (quoting Fortnightly, 
392 U.S. at, 398–99).  
 197. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390, 399.  
 198. Id. at 400.  
 199. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 398 (1974) (citing 
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390).  
 200. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 399–400.  
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interconnection—suffers from the same logical flaw: in none of these 
operations is there any nexus with the defendants’ reception and 
rechanneling of the broadcasters’ copyrighted materials.”201 
2. Regulation After the 1976 Amendment 
After these two essential decisions in favor of transmissions 
technology,
202
 Congress stepped in with the 1976 Amendment to add 
and define the terms “to transmit” and “public performance,”203 with 
the purpose of abrogating both Teleprompter and Fortnightly.
204
 
[A] sing[er] is performing when he or she sings a song; a 
broadcasting network is performing when it transmits his or her 
performance (whether simultaneously or from records); a local 
broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast; 
a cable television system is performing when it retransmits the 
broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is performing when 
he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or 
communicates it by turning on a receiving set.
205
 
Furthermore, “Congress intended to cover all transmission activity 
in its broad definition of transmit.”206 “[U]nder the broad definitions 
found in § 101 of the [1976] Act, a transmission is a public 
performance whether made directly or indirectly to the public and 
whether the transmitter originates, concludes or simply carries the 
signal.”207 “The concepts of public performance and public display 
cover not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act 
by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to 
the public.”208 
 
 201. Id. at 404-405. “[T]his Court has in two recent decisions explicitly disavowed the 
view that the reception of an electronic broadcast can constitute a performance, when the 
broadcaster himself is licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he broadcasts.” 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160–61 (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 
390; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. 394).  
 202. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 403-5. 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 204. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014) (“History makes plain that 
one of Congress’ primary purposes in amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to overturn 
this Court’s determination that community antenna television (CATV) systems (the 
precursors of modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope.”).  
 205. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub 
nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663). 
 206. Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 12 (D. Minn. 
1984)  aff’d, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).  
 207. Id. at 813 aff’d, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).  
 208. Id. at 811–12 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676).  
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Like the language for determining whether a work of authorship is 
“fixed,”209 the Transmit Clause’s language, “‘any device or process’ is 
‘broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of 
wired or wireless communications media, including but by no means 
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them.’”210 The 
Transmit Clause incorporates public performance, which is defined in 
17 U.S.C. § 101: 
To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means— 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display 
of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by 
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different 
times.
211
 
Even after the 1976 Amendment, courts were split regarding 
interpretation of “public performance.” In one case, a hotel did “not 
violate section 106(4) by providing in-room videodisc players and 
renting videodiscs to its guests.”212 There, the court reasoned that there 
was no public performance because “[t]he movies are viewed 
exclusively in guest rooms, places where individuals enjoy a 
substantial degree of privacy, not unlike their own homes.”213 
Significant to the lower-court decisions in Aereo,
214
 the Cartoon 
Network (“Cablevision”) case held that a cable company’s DVR 
system did not violate owners’ copyrights where the customer “made” 
the copies, the cable company’s embodiments of copyrighted programs 
were not “fixed,” and playback transmissions were not performances 
“to the public.”215 
 
 209. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).  
 210. Hubbard Broad, 593 F. Supp. 808, 811–12 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664).  
 211. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45 (D.D.C. 2013) 
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 212. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 282 (9th 
Cir. 1989); see 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976). 
 213. Columbia Pictures, 866 F.2d at 281.  
 214. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d sub nom. 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. ABC, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 215. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 
2008) (Playback of copies by means of cable company’s remote storage digital video 
recorder system (RS-DVR) did not directly infringe content providers’ right under 17 USCS 
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In contrast, a district court found copyright infringement where, 
without license to the transmitted content, FilmOn X, an internet-based 
television service, assigned each of its subscribers a temporarily 
assigned antenna and hard-drive directory.
216
 With FilmOn X’s service, 
“the mini-antennas [were] networked together so that a single tuner 
server and router, video encoder, and distribution endpoint [could] 
communicate with them all” and FilmOn X captured the television 
signal to pass through the “single electronic transmission process of 
aggregating servers and electronic equipment.”217 The court reasoned 
that “‘[t]he non-public nature of the place of the performance has no 
bearing on whether or not those who enjoy the performance constitute 
‘the public’ under the transmit clause.’”218 Additionally, an earlier case 
involving Aereo, Inc. held that the company had infringed on 
copyright.
219
 “The definitions in the [Copyright] Act contain 
sweepingly broad language and the Transmit Clause easily 
encompasses Aereo’s process of transmitting copyright-protected 
material to its paying customers.”220 
3. The United States Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 1976 
Amendment 
Today, technological innovation continues to catalyze 
amendments to expand the Copyright Act’s scope. Authors retain the 
exclusive right to “perform”221 and “display”222 their work publicly. 
Indeed, the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act actually expanded 
the scope of liability, with the addition of the definitions of “to 
transmit” and “pubic performance.”223 The Supreme Court of the 
United States recently decided to settle the varying interpretations of 
these clauses in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, 
 
§ 106(4) to publicly perform their copyrighted works because such transmissions were not 
performances “to the public” within meaning of 17 USCS § 101 where each RS-DVR 
playback transmission was made to single subscriber using single unique copy produced by 
that subscriber.).  
 216. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.) 
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 217. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47–48 (D.D.C.) 
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 218. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV 
Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).  
 219. Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1198 (D. 
Utah 2014).  
 220. Cmty. Television of Utah, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.  
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2016).  
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2016).  
 223. Compare Copyright Act § 101, 90 Stat. 2543-44 (1976) with Copyright Act, 35 
Stat. 1075 (1909); see supra Part III(B)(2).  
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Inc.
224
 
“For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast television 
programming over the Internet, virtually as the programming is being 
broadcast.”225 Much of the programming is copyrighted, and Aereo 
neither owns nor licenses the works.
226
 “Aereo’s system is made up of 
servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a 
central warehouse.”227 To watch a television show, the subscriber 
selects the currently airing show he wants to watch from a menu on 
Aereo’s website.228 That selection prompts the Aereo’s server to tune 
an antenna, which is dedicated to that specific subscriber, to the 
broadcast airing the selected show.
229
 Via a transcoder, the signals the 
antenna receives are translated “into data that can be transmitted over 
the Internet.”230 The same server saves the data for the subscriber in his 
specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and then streams the show to the 
subscriber’s screen after a few seconds of programming have been 
saved to the folder.
231
 The subscriber is able to view the entire show 
through this stream, only a few seconds behind the broadcast.
232
 
“In Aereo’s view, it does not perform. It does no more than supply 
equipment that ‘emulate[s] the operation of a home antenna and [digital 
video recorder (DVR)].’”233 However, in view of legislative intent and 
history behind the 1976 Amendment,
234
 the Court brought self-
proclaimed ‘equipment-providers’235 within the purview of liability 
under the Copyright Act, though precedent
236
 would have held 
otherwise. “Because Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those 
of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach, 
Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.”237 
The Court’s ruling confirmed that to perform an audiovisual work 
means “‘to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds 
accompanying it audible,’”238 and erased the Court’s former line 
 
 224. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  
 225. Id. at 2503.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  
 229. Id.  
 230. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at 2504.  
 234. See infra IV(B)(1–3).  
 235. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.  
 236. See supra Part III(B)(1).  
 237. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2501.  
 238. Id. at 2505-6 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)). 
188 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol.57 
between broadcaster and viewer with respect to performing a work.
239
 
In interpreting “public performance,” the Court reasoned, “[t]he Act 
thereby suggests that ‘the public’ consists of a large group of people 
outside of a family and friends.”240 Additionally, “‘the public’ need not 
be situated together, spatially or temporally” for a public performance 
to occur in violation of the Copyright Act.
241
 Accordingly, “the 
subscribers to whom Aereo transmits television programs constitute 
‘the public’” under the Act.242 
4. Aereo’s Aftermath 
By holding in favor of copyright and against media transmissions 
technology, the Court has empowered Congress’ ever-expanding scope 
of copyright. Though the Court essentially limited Aereo to its facts,
243
 
and expressly declined to consider “whether the public performance 
right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for 
something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as 
the remote storage of content,”244 its ruling endangers technological 
innovation because even self-titled ‘equipment providers’ may 
“publicly perform.”245 
“The majority, Justice Scalia said, reached its conclusion ‘only by 
disregarding widely accepted rules for service-provider liability and 
adopting in their place an improvised standard (‘looks-like-cable-TV’) 
that will sow confusion for years to come.’”246 Furthermore, “a 
decision in the Networks’ favor will stifle technological innovation and 
imperil billions of dollars of investments in cloud-storage services.”247 
 
 239. Id. at 2505 (“Congress enacted new language that erased the Court’s line between 
broadcaster and viewer, in respect to ‘perform[ing]’ a work.”).  
 240. Id. at 2510.  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 2509.  
 243. “In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a 
user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s equipment and selection of the content 
transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.” 
Id. at 2507.  
 244. Id. at 2511.  
 245. Hughes, supra note 13, at 3 (“The court said it has yet to consider if public 
performance rights are infringed by such actions as the remote storage of content.”); accord 
WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 280 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1585 
(2013) (“Additionally, the growth of ‘cloud-based systems,’ or virtual platforms where 
content resides remotely on a distant server, further highlights the uncertainty as to whether 
an Internet retransmission service is or utilizes a facility that receives and retransmits 
television signals.”); but see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510 (“Congress, while intending the 
Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, did not intend to 
discourage or to control the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.”).  
 246. Copyright Infringement, 26 BUS. TORTS REP. 290, 294 (2014).  
 247. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Justice Scalia’s prediction may already be coming true, as since the 
Supreme Court’s decision, Aereo was forced to file for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.
248
 
Though the Court held that Aereo’s activities were substantially 
similar to CATV companies such that it infringed under the Copyright 
Act,
249
 the Copyright Office later denied the company a compulsory 
license,
250
 which would have enabled it to continue its business 
provided that it comply with the rules of Title 17, section 111 and pay 
royalties to the copyright owners.
251
 Consequently, $95 million in 
venture capital equity has been squandered on technology that has been 
given no way to survive the onslaught of regulation.
252
 Aereo’s 
creditors are each claiming in the range of $117,000 to $600,000,
253
 
and potentially tens of millions in damages to the broadcasters that 
hold contingent claims against it.
254
 
In the holding that launched Aereo’s demise, the Court 
recommended that “commercial actors or other interested entities” seek 
action from Congress to address their concerns “with the relationship 
between the development and use of such technologies and the 
Copyright Act.”255 Similarly, “the dissenters predicted that Congress 
may decide that the Copyright Act ‘needs an upgrade.’”256 
IV. PROPOSAL 
A. Return to a Balance 
The mouth of the Copyright Act has become so great as to 
 
 248. Pete Brush, Aereo Files for Ch. 11 in Bid to Dodge Copyright Suits, LAW 360 
(Nov. 21, 2014, 10:59 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/media/articles/598433?nl_pk=168332d2-9841-4bc9-9ea4-
274664e5dda0&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=media.  
 249. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506. 
 250. In a letter to Aereo, “the Copyright Office says that . . , ‘internet retransmissions of 
broadcast television’ still fall outside the scope of their ability to license under section 111.” 
Kate Cox, Copyright Office Disagrees with Aereo That Aereo is a Cable Company Now, 
CONSUMERIST (July 17, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/07/17/copyright-office-
disagrees-with-aereo-that-aereo-is-a-cable-company-now/, also available at http://www. 
nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_letter.pdf.  
 251. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014). “Section 111 creates a complex, highly detailed 
compulsory licensing scheme that sets out the conditions, including the payment of 
compulsory fees, under which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2506.  
 252. Andrew Scurria, Aereo Plans to Shop Infringing Streaming IP in Ch. 11, LAW 360 
(Nov. 24, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/598816/aereo-plans-to-shop-
infringing-streaming-ip-in-ch-11.  
 253. Brush, supra note 248.  
 254. Scurria, supra note 252.  
 255. Id. at 2511.  
 256. Hughes, supra note 13, at 4.  
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swallow technological innovation. Every congressional amendment has 
enlarged its hungry jaw further, reaching a wider range of works, 
audiences, and performances, for a longer and longer duration. While it 
is important to compensate authors as encouragement and reward for 
their work, the original purpose of awarding a limited private 
monopoly has been lost in the money feast on original sales, 
retransmission fees,
257
 and infringement penalties;
258
 copyright has 
become more about compensating the copyright owner than about 
promoting art for society. Consequently, both art and science suffer. 
The principal purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 is to “promote 
progress of the ‘useful arts’ . . . by rewarding creativity, and its 
principal function is the protection of original works, rather than 
ordinary commercial products that use copyrighted material as a 
marketing aid.”259 Like patent law, copyright law rewards the owner as 
a secondary consideration.
260
 “[Copyright law] is intended definitely to 
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without 
burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement to the 
production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the 
world.”261 
B. Amend the Copyright Act 
In view of the messy legislative history and flip-flopping media 
jurisprudence,
262
 it is crucial that Congress legislate clearly and with 
the mindset that technological innovation is fast-paced and 
unpredictable. Additionally, the foremost consideration should be the 
Constitution itself, which grants Congress its power to establish 
copyright protection to advance both arts and sciences.
263
 To balance 
these competing interests, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to 
(1) allow compulsory licensing for any transmission technology, and 
(2) grant an author exclusive rights under a single term of a ten-year 
duration,
264
 not renewable by any person or corporation, with the term 
determined by the date of creation.
265
 
 
 257. “CBS . . . said earlier this year that it’s going to make $1 billion a year in 
retransmission fees by 2017, and $2 billion by 2020.” Bill Donahue, FCC Chair Debuts 
Plan to Treat Web TV Like Cable, LAW 360 (Oct. 28, 2014, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/591356/fcc-chair-debuts-plan-to-treat-web-tv-like-cable.  
 258. See supra Part I(B).  
 259. Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998).  
 260. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (internal quotations omitted).  
 261. Id.  
 262. See supra Part III(B).  
 263. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.  
 264. Or briefer.  
 265. Measurement of the copyright term should remain as specified under 17 U.S.C. § 
302(c). See supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(e) term duration chart.  
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1. Congress is in the Best Position to Create Balance 
“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent 
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the 
market for copyrighted materials.”266 “Congress has the constitutional 
authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied 
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by 
such new technology.”267 Furthermore, the Court will ultimately defer 
to Congress’ legislation just as it did in Aereo,268 so it is important that 
Congress determine United States copyright policy. 
2. Compulsory Licensing for Any Transmission Technology 
Compulsory licensing should not be limited to cable systems.
269
 
Rather, section 111 of Title 17 should reflect the encompassing 
language of section 102
270
 and allow any technology, “now known or 
later developed” to be permitted a compulsory license under the 
Copyright Act. 
As technologies have developed,
271
 Congress has continued to 
amend the Copyright Act to protect copyright owners. The Copyright 
Act should be similarly amended to allow new technologies to transmit 
works to the public. Congress should incorporate to the compulsory 
license section broad language that would account for any current and 
future transmission technology. Allowing other technologies to license 
in bulk rather than piecemeal would allow greater competition in the 
media transmission industry, which is in the interest of the public 
(access to copyrighted media), the economy (competition fosters 
business), and technological innovation (transmission and 
telecommunication technologies would be championed and stimulated, 
rather than suppressed).
272
 
3. Ten-year Copyright Term 
At the time the Constitution was enacted in 1790, the Framers 
could not have anticipated the technology we have today and the rapid 
pace at which it evolves. Consequently, Congress’ discretion to 
 
 266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).  
 267. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.  
 268. See supra Part III(B)(3).  
 269. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).  
 270. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016); see supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(b).  
 271. Sony, 464 U.S. at 462 n. 9 (Congress has been “spurred” to action when 
“significant developments in technology and communication” render the Copyright Act 
inadequate with regard to protecting copyright owners.).  
 272. Aereo’s demise may have been prevented if it had been permitted to obtain a 
compulsory license. See Bill Donahue, Aereo Can’t Use Compulsory License, Judge Says, 
LAW 360 (Oct. 23, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/589934.  
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continue expanding copyrights is nearly boundless, so long as there is 
some time limitation on the grant of exclusive rights to copyright 
owners. This burden is easily met so long as Congress does not bestow 
rights in perpetuity to authors. 
As evidenced by the significant extension of time
273
 added to the 
duration of exclusive rights for copyright holders nearly every time the 
Copyright Act is amended,
274
 Congress is wielding its power to the 
point of excess. Though being very inclusive in the scope of works 
protected promotes authorship, as intended under the Constitution, the 
consistent extension of copyright duration does not. Having a long-
term grant of exclusive rights to original works of authorship is 
problematic for three reasons: 
(1) It deprives the public of the ability to use original works to 
create derivative works for up to two lifetimes
275
 from when the work 
was first created; 
(2) It rewards those “heirs, estates, or corporate successors” who 
did not create the work
276
 and will likely maintain and extend the 
monopoly for the second term, keeping the work from the public;
277
 
and 
(3) It inhibits the progress of technological innovation.
278
 
a. Public Deprivation 
First, granting a limited monopoly in copyright, like in patent, 
withholds works of significance from public use unless the author 
deems otherwise. Instead of withholding works, our society should 
consider releasing them for public use after the author receives 
compensation. 
The Copyright Act “imposes upon the public certain expression-
related costs in the form of (1) royalties that may be higher than 
 
 273. Most recently, “[t]he economic effect of [the Copyright Term Extension Act’s] 20–
year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s founding—is to make the 
copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 
(2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 274. See supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(c).  
 275. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2016) provides for a term of seventy years after the life of the 
author; so if the author is young, and people live on average for about seventy years, the 
copyright term could be for approximately two lifetimes.  
 276. “[The CTEA’s] primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but 
to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
 277. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C) (2016) allows certain others to renew the author’s 
copyright for a second term of sixty-seven years, during which time said beneficiaries could 
continue to benefit from royalties, so there is every reason to keep the work from the public 
domain.  
 278. “[The CTEA’s] practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of 
‘Science.’” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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necessary to evoke creation of the relevant work, and (2) a requirement 
that one seeking to reproduce a copyrighted work must obtain the 
copyright holder’s permission.”279 Higher royalties mean higher costs, 
which could limit dissemination of artwork to the public.
280
  
Attempting to license works is an additional burden that could 
prohibit reproduction or creation of a derivative work even where an 
author would not object,
281
 just because of the difficulty of obtaining 
permission.
282
 This burden could also prohibit the public from learning 
about and researching protected works.
283
 
Open-sourcing content, or releasing works into the public domain, 
would allow the public to build upon the art in society, furthering 
creativity, art, and expression. It would also provide a greater range of 
works for society to enjoy and from which to learn, for broadcasters 
and publishers to transmit, produce, perform, and exploit, and would 
enable the public to access both classic and newer works. Tesla Motors 
Inc. (“Tesla”), an electric car manufacturer and distributor, has 
successfully promoted this idea, and should serve as an example for 
copyright. 
In June 2014, Tesla released its vehicle patents to the public for 
good faith use.
284
 Tesla’s open-source approach promotes futuristic 
thinking and the idea that “[t]echnology leadership is not defined by 
patents, which history has repeatedly shown to be small protection 
indeed against a determined competitor, but rather by the ability of a 
company to attract and motivate the world’s most talented 
engineers.”285 Moreover, “Tesla shares barely moved after the 
company’s announcement. The stock closed down 95 cents, or less 
 
 279. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 280. Id.  
 281. The permissions requirement is prohibitive: “(1) because it may prove expensive to 
track down or to contract with the copyright holder, (2) because the holder may prove 
impossible to find, or (3) because the holder when found may deny permission either 
outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain.” Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 282. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 283. “Indeed, in an age where computer-accessible databases promise to facilitate 
research and learning, the permissions requirement can stand as a significant obstacle to 
realization of that technological hope.” Id. 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 284. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA, (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you; Jerry Hirsch & Tiffany 
Hsu, Elon Musk Opens Up Tesla Patents; It ‘Isn’t Entirely Altruistic’, LA TIMES, June 12, 
2014, 3:48 PM, http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-elon-musk-opens-tesla-
patents-20140612-story.html#page=1; Brian Solomon, Tesla Goes Open Source: Elon Musk 
Releases Patents to ‘Good Faith’ Use, FORBES, (June 12, 2014, 1:21 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/06/12/tesla-goes-open-source-elon-musk-
releases-patents-to-good-faith-use/. 
 285. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA, (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.  
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than 1%, at $203.52.”286 Elon Musk, chief executive officer of Tesla, 
reasoned, “You want to be innovating so fast that you invalidate your 
prior patents, in terms of what really matters. It’s the velocity of 
innovation that matters.”287 
Similarly, the Copyright Act should reflect long-term thinking in 
favor of the public good, as opposed to extending the time for a few 
very lucrative works to make money.
288
 There is plenty of money to be 
made when new works are created, and new derivations of popular 
works may become equally popular. Accordingly, the duration of 
copyright should be limited so as to enable authors to be rewarded for 
their works, but then to also promptly enable the public to both use and 
enjoy said original works. 
Authors will also benefit from this approach because it will 
increase the competition and range of works that may be created. 
Greater competition means more works and potentially more profit. 
Authors will be compensated, but publishers, broadcasters, and other 
interested transmitters of copyrighted works will need to compensate 
authors at the outset instead of making long-term royalty payments. 
Though this may be riskier than making royalty payments based on 
percentage of sales, most business investments involve some degree of 
risk. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that shortening the duration 
of copyright would prevent authors from getting paid, as publishers, 
broadcasters, and the like will still need new content to distribute, and 
advertisers will still need audiences. 
b. Non-Authors Rewarded 
Second, instead of furthering the trend of taking works out of the 
public domain and limiting access, the public domain should be 
expanded. It is to both the author’s and the public’s advantage “to 
provide an adequate term of protection to make it commercially 
feasible for publishers and other distributors to aid him in exploiting 
his work,”289 as allowing the author to make money encourages artistic 
 
 286. See Hirsch & Hsu, supra note 284.  
 287.  Mike Masnick, Of Course Tesla Wasn’t Just Being Altruistic In Opening Up Its 
Patents: That’s The Whole Point!, TECHDIRT, (June 23, 2014, 9:03 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140622/06531127647/course-tesla-wasnt-just-being-
altruistic-opening-up-its-patents-thats-whole-point.shtml; Ashlee Vance, Why Elon Musk 
Just Opened Tesla’s Patents to His Biggest Rivals, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (June 12, 
2014, 4:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-12/why-elon-musk-
just-opened-teslas-patents-to-his-biggest-rivals.  
 288. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.  
 289. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 74 (1960), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf; 
accord Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[C]opyright law should be 
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creation. However, the current duration of seventy years beyond the 
author’s death is a grossly unnecessary grant of protection. Limiting 
the duration of exclusive copyright ownership to 10 years will “serve[] 
the ultimate purpose of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’ by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the public 
domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.”290 
“The Clause authorizes a ‘tax on readers for the purpose of giving 
a bounty to writers.’”291 Once that ‘tax’ has been paid, the work should 
be released. “[O]nly about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years 
old retain commercial value—i.e., still generate royalties after that 
time.”292 Of that two percent, “books, songs, and movies . . . still earn 
about $400 million per year in royalties.”293 In his dissent to a Supreme 
Court case upholding the constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1988, Justice Breyer reasoned, “one might 
conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will 
mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of 
existing copyrights—copyrights that, together, already will have earned 
many billions of dollars in royalty ‘reward.’”294 Essentially, the rich are 
getting richer, at the public’s expense. 
The Constitution does not propose rewarding anyone other than 
the author of the work. Thus, those who have not made the works 
should not be permitted to monopolize works for the purpose of private 
profit. “The [Copyright] Clause exists not to ‘provide a special private 
benefit,’ but ‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good.’”295 Additionally, shortening the copyright term will allow the 
public to benefit from original works of authorship and to create more 
works based on the originals. 
c. Technological Innovation Inhibited 
Finally, innovation is being crushed in copyright’s hungry jaw. 
With all of the penalties for infringement,
296
 uncertainty as to what will 
constitute infringement given the narrow Aereo ruling,
297
 and lack of 
 
used to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage 
production and dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for 
one who submits his work to the public.”).  
 290. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003).  
 291. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 292. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E. Rappaport, CRS Report for Congress, 
Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values (1998)).  
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. at 249.  
 295. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).  
 296. See supra Part I(B).  
 297. See supra Part III(B)(3).  
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viable alternatives to sustain business after the Court has ruled,
298
 it 
does not make sense to invest in innovative transmission technologies 
as an inventor, investor, or businessperson. 
“[C]opyright was designed ‘primarily for the benefit of the 
public,’ for ‘the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will 
stimulate writing and invention.’”299 Copyright will serve this purpose 
if it is limited in duration to ten years. With the speed of technological 
innovation and the public interest in developing telecommunications, 
there is every reason to limit copyright to encourage innovation and 
investment therein. 
Encouraging innovation will also increase accessibility to art 
works, which is desirable for both authors and the public. For authors, 
greater dissemination potentially means greater popularity, which 
means greater compensation from publishers, broadcasters, or other 
licensed distributors. For the public, works can be enjoyed via any 
available means – in person at a museum, in bed on a smart phone, on a 
plane using a tablet, at a friend’s house on a television screen, etcetera. 
Greater accessibility likely means more views, more purchases, and 
more advertising revenue. 
This duration limitation will also enable competition in 
transmissions technologies and decrease cases of infringement, like 
Aereo, that completely quash transmission technology business. 
Currently, copyright law is overbroad,
300
 and so heavily litigated that 
new transmissions technologies do not stand a chance. “The primary 
objective of copyright” is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”301 
Therefore, authors should be rewarded with private monopolies only to 
the extent that the reward encourages authorship and does not suppress 
technological innovation. Limiting the copyright term to a ten-year 
duration could achieve this goal. 
C. Application of Proposal to Aereo, Inc. 
If this proposal were in effect, Aereo, Inc. would likely still be in 
business today, serving the public and developing new technology.
302
 
Likewise, artists would likely still produce works, as this proposal 
would incentivize the production of copyrightable works for a ten-year 
 
 298. See Hughes, supra, at note 245 and accompanying text.  
 299. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R.Rep. 
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6–7 (1909)).  
 300. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–12 (“The CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights 
categorically fails to ‘promote the Progress of Science,’ petitioners argue, because it does 
not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.”).  
 301. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. at 349).  
 302. See Patel, supra note 10, at 1, 5.  
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term. 
Alternatively, under a compulsory licensing scheme that would 
permit all types of transmission technologies,
303
 Aereo could have 
obtained a compulsory license for transmitting those works still 
copyrighted and the vastly greater number of works that would be in 
the public domain. The public would benefit from good prices and 
greater access to works,
304
 and Aereo could have used its profits to 
develop its transmissions capabilities, again serving the public through 
technological development. 
Furthermore, copyright owners would obtain incentives to 
produce more works through the retransmission fees Aereo would pay; 
and those whose works had entered the public domain would have 
every reason to again produce more work to capitalize on the public 
demand for media. Thus, both science and art would develop with the 
aid of the other in a way that would benefit businesses, artists, and, 
most importantly, the public. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, copyright is overwhelming the progression of 
transmission technology and is threatening the future of such 
innovation.  
Congress should return to the underlying purpose of its 
constitutional grant of authority and limit copyright duration such that 
science may balance with art. I propose limiting the scope of copyright 
duration in accordance with the Constitution. This solution would 
balance the public’s competing interests: “Creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve 
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, 
and the other arts.”305 Lest the public suffer from loss of both art and 
science, Congress should prevent copyright takeover. To do so, the 
interests of the public in accessing both innovative transmission 
technologies and works of art must be weighed over any private 
monetary interests. 
 
 
 303. See supra Part IV(B)(2).  
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